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Feature Article 
SOMBRE REFLECTIONS ON THE NORTH SEA OIL TAX SYSTEM 
by Anthony Clunies-Ross, Department of Economics 
University of Strathclyde 
The tax system on British North Sea oil and gas has altered in each of the 
five years since 1979. It was stiffened considerably in that year, further 
in 1980, and again quite considerably in 1981 when a whole new tax with its 
own ruj.es auded further complications to the existing maze. Then in 1982 
the new tax was dropped from the end of that year, some other rearrangements 
were made, and again this year there was a fu.ther relaxation, though mainly 
relating to new leases. The general outline of the system was established 
only in 1971> as the first oil was due to start flowing. So there have 
altogether been six changes in nine years. If certainty in the fiscal 
treatment is to be desired as an encouragement to investors, then this 
record is a rather gloomy one. Admittedly other oil-producing nations also 
changed the rules repeatedly in the 1970's. Such was the case with the 
United States and Australia. The Americans also introduced a new oil tax in 
1981. Yet the United Kingdom starting virtually afresh after the snock of 
the first oil crisis, and, since it was free of many of the political 
constraints that hamstrung oil policy in America, might have hoped to build 
a set of arrangements that could last. 
The immediate reason for the frequent changes was oDvious: the erratic 
course of world oil prices since the early 1970's. But is it inevitable 
that the rules should change each time the prices change, with new taxes 
coming out like new models of cars? Is there not some way of making rules 
that themselves take account of changes in the price of the product? This 
article will suggest that the solution to the puzzle lies in a combination 
of indexation and a discounted-cash-flow basis for the tax, while auctioning 
of extraction rights would provide a very useful supplement. A brief 
discussion of principles is needed to make the point cl^ar. 
Some Principles 
Lik_ much of the rest of the world, this country leaves most of the risks, 
and most of the management, of oil extraction to private enterprise. There 
are good reasons for this, albeit there may also be good reasons for having 
a puDlic corporation as one competitor-participant (in the style of BNOC 
during its brief heyday). The risk-taking and the management have their 
price; in other words the private extractors require a certain level of 
return. Unless they believe that they can on balance expect that return, 
they will not show much interest. However, the state will quite reasonably 
aim to take as much as possible of the surplus earnings or the extraction 
beyond what is necessary to reward the extractors for what they provide. 
This surplus arising from exploitation of any oilfield may be regarded as 
the property value of the field, its value abstracted from whatever other 
resources may be applied to it. This value will in practice vary with 
circumstances and expectations, but, such as it is at the time, the 
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authorities may properly and justly aspire to recover it. This value is 
sometimes referred to as the "rent" of the oilfield by analogy with the 
rental value 01 a piece of agricultural land. The difference between the 
two cases is that the agricultural land with proper husbandry will continue 
realising its rental value indefinitely while a mine or oilfield will 
realise it all over a period of, say, twenty years. 
As with all taxation it is desirable to disturb the investor's decisions as 
little as possible unless there is some clear special reason for doing so. 
The investor can be presumed to be planning and operating in such a w«y as, 
according to his own perceptions, to maximise the excess of the value of 
what is produced over the cost oi producing it. Unless there is a ci«.arly 
identifiable reason why the value or the cost to him differs from the value 
or the cost to the commonwealth, he should be allowed and encouraged to do 
just that. How the surplus is distributed is a subsequent question. 
Failing some such grounds for altering the context of the investor's 
decisions, the tax system should as far as possible leave them unchanged; in 
the technical jargon, it should be neutral. If it is more profitable to 
exhaust a particular field over 25 years rather than over 15, then the tax 
system snould not, without some special reason, have the effect oi inducing 
the investor to concentrate the extraction into 15 years. If in the absence 
of tax it would be profitable to go on lifting oil from a particular hole, 
then the tax system should not prima facie have the effect of rendering it 
unprofitable. 
If a tax system were to have the effect oi denying an extractor the 
prospect of the minimum returns that he would require from a particular 
investment (when in the absence of tax he would be able to expect them), 
then the tax system is eliminating what would otherwise prima facie be a 
socially valuable investment. Conversely if the tax system, as they 
sometimes do, renders an investment profitable that would not otherwise be 
so, it is in effect subsidising what failing other evidence must be regarded 
as a socially wasteful outlay. 
This requirement oi "neutrality" and the requirement for extracting the 
whole of the "rent" of an oil field would appear to be consistent with each 
other. Leave the investors the minimum return that they require but collect 
the rest, and in principle it would seem that both requirements would be 
met. The principle is sound and in essence it follows from the 160-year-old 
analysis of David Ricardo. It is the foundation for the land-tax policy 
advueated by the followers of Henry George. The question simply is how, if 
at all, this approach can be pursued over oil extraction and other types of 
mining. 
So«e Experience 
There are two broad approacnes, which could be called before and after. 
The before method has been used by the U S federal authorities since 195 4 
for appropriating the mineral rent oi offshore oil and gas. It has also 
been used by some American states and Canadian Provinces. It consists of 
allocating extraction rights by auction for a sum payable in advance, and it 
is called in America "cash-bonus bidding". Exponents of this approach argue 
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t h a t payment ot what i s bid a t auction cannot a f fec t the pace or exuent or 
techniques of e x t r a c t i o n s ince i t i s water under the bridge by the time 
dec is ions on these mat te rs are made. I t w i l l a lso not deter any pro jec t 
that would otherwise be undertaken, since no bidder wil l presumably bid more 
than he regards i t as worthwhile to pay. 
But wil l the cash-bonus bid rea l i se the whole or most of the property value 
of the o i l l ease? That i s not so easy to decide a pr ior i . Advocates of 
cash-bonus bidding claim that each bidder wil l offer something close to his 
e s t ima te 01 the f u l l r e n t a l value of the l ea se for which he i s bidding, 
since otherwise he may lose i t to a competitor. Yet, unless they are aware 
of l ively competition, oi l companies may not bid the ful l amount that they 
would be prepared to pay. Moreover the re i s g rea t unce r t a in ty about the 
vaiue oi any p a r t i c u l a r l ease at the time t h a t i t i s put up for auc t ion , 
indeed unt i l operative d r i l l i ng actually begins. And there i s a measure of 
unce r t a in ty p a r t l y because or v a r i a t i o n in the pr ice of the product u n t i l 
the end of the l e a s e ' s working l i f e . There i s also p o l i t i c a l r i s k , the 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a u t h o r i t i e s w i l l make fu r the r imposts on the i n v e s t o r ' s 
earnings or n a t i o n a l i z e a s s e t s without compensation. Thus i t would seem 
that an investor may be very conservative in the estimate oi a lease 's value 
t h a t he i s prepared to submit as a bid. In t h a t case only a par t of the 
t rue property value oi the l e a se s offered may t y p i c a l l y be r e a l i s e d a t 
auction. 
Evidence from ear ly US federa l s a l e s of of f -shore l e a s e s , u n t i l the ear ly 
1970's, seemed to bel ie these gloomy assessments. The realised returns to 
the companies over large areas of off-shore f ie lds released in the mid-1950s 
appear in fac t to be lower a f t e r the cash-bonus bid and a l l taxes were 
deducted than in US indus t ry as a whole, whicn suggested t h a t the winning 
Didders had in fac t paid more a l t o g e t h e r than the t o t a l property value of 
t h e i r l ea ses (Mead, 1977: 53-56). To explain t h i s r e s u l t we can say tha t 
the auctioning may give some upward bias to the sums recovered in re la t ion 
to how the market values the l ease in t h a t the winning bidder i s the most 
o p t i m i s t i c , not the one tha t gives the mean b id . For p r a c t i c a l purposes 
there does seem to have been a c t i v e competi t ion for the federa l of f -shore 
l e a s e s , s ince a very la rge number of companies bid a t some time or other and 
thus were potent ia l b idders a t an auct ion t h a t was and i s conducted with 
sealed b ids . Fur ther , l a rge companies may have blocks in a number of 
different f ie lds and so spread the i r r i sks , which may mean that they do not 
feel the need of e s t ima t ing value very conserva t ive ly in t h e i r bids for 
par t icular leases . I t was also probably assumed (though not correctly as i t 
turned out) that the US author i t ies would not a l t e r the ru les . Finally much 
of the period in wnich the ear ly federa l of f -shore l ea ses were being 
exploited experienced fa l l ing o i l prices. 
I t io correspondingly when o i l p r i ces r i s e unexpectedly tha t cash-bonus 
oidding al lows windfa l l p r o f i t s to accrue to the o i l companies. This was 
r e a l i s e d in the US from the time of the f i r s t o i l c r i s i s , and a number of 
more or less unsatisfactory devices have been introduced in order to prevent 
the companies from g e t t i n g away with too much. Cash-bonus bidding would 
seem to be an excellent system for extracting residual rent from oi l f ie lds 
if (1) p r i ces are s t a b l e , (2) a la rge number of companies are known to be 
interes ted, many of them large enough to spread thei r r i sks widely, and (3) 
the companies t rus t the government not to a l t e r the ru les . Since at leas t 
the f i r s t of these conditions does not hold at a l l , and the second may not, 
and the t h i rd w i l l not , be commonly t rue outs ide the US, i t would be wrong 
to rely on th is device as the sole rent col lector . 
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The second, approach to neutral collection of mineral rent is to assess it 
after rather than before, to base the government's take on what has actually 
been realised. If there is a way of judging what the realised rent or 
surplus actually is, then a large slice of it can be creamed off by the 
authorities without impinging upon the investor's decisions. Neither or the 
two common tax devices, the royalty depending on the value of the product 
and the conventional income or profit tax, is based at all closely on the 
surplus or rent as the investor is likely to perceive it. The ad valorem 
royalty is related entirely to gross receipts and not at all to costs. The 
income tax, though complex in its assessment, derives from a concept of 
income appropriate enough to farming or nail making but quite out of place 
in mining. 
In fact it seems likeiy that oil or mining-company executives will judge the 
prospective success of a project by some form of discounted-cash-flow 
estimate. If they follow the standard advice or the schools, they will 
discount prospective cash flows by a discount rate that reflects the minimum 
return that they require. If the discounted sum is positive with some 
required degree of confidence, they will judge the project eligible, and any 
positive present value can be regarded as a surplus: it goes beyond what is 
necessary to induce them to invest. It seems to follow that, if the 
authorities could guarantee that the tax they collected would represent a 
constant fraction of that surplus, never impinging on the receipts necessary 
to meet the investor's minimum requirements and at the same time never 
abating the tax for additional costs except so far as is necessary to meet 
the investor's minimum requirements for covering those costs, the tax would 
be neutral. It would neither deter nor subsidise any investment or other 
outlay. At the same time it could take a large proportion of the surplus. 
There is an important reservation to these statements. The tax could not 
stand at 100% of the surplus. Otherwise the investor would lose every 
incentive to economy. In practice it should not be at a rate very close to 
100%, for fear Oi encouraging what is called "gold plating", namely outlays 
which, though they reduce profit, reduce it so little after tax that they 
are likely to be authorised if they have a consumer value for the executives 
of the investing company: over-elaborate offices, lavish entertaining, or 
anything that makes life easier or more glamorous. It is not possible to 
say at what marginal tax rate these socially wasteful outlays are likely to 
become important. ProbaDly rates over 90% are hazardous. Oil men probaDly 
require the possibility of occasional spectacular coups to make them accept 
the risks oi the business at all, and perhaps the knowledge that they can 
keep at least 15 or 20% of the surplus is a desirable sweetener. 
To tax the surplus and nothing but the surplus in this way requires the tax 
to be based on cash flow rather than "income" if in fact it is cash flow 
that the investor himself is assessing. The idea of a cash flow base for 
business taxation is one that has been much discussed, but I believe that it 
has not been consistently applied except in mining and oil and on those 
industries only within a few less developed countries and only since the 
mid-1970s. The cash-flow base eliminates several of the disturbing 
complexities required by an income base: notably over depreciation and stock 
appreciation and the distinction between capital and recurrent outlays. It 
does, however, present two alternative difficulties in practice when applied 
to a discrete project. Either the tax authorities must subsidise negative 
cash flows as they occur at the same rate at which they tax positive cash 
flows, or eise they must apply a discount rate for time to balance the 
negative cash flows of one period against the positive cash flows of 
another. If they choose the latter course, they should, by the reasoning 
already given, apply a discount rate equal to that used by the investor. 
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Too low a discount rate will run the hazard of deterring eligible outlays; 
too high a discount rate may subsidise ineligible ones. 
The trouble is that the authorities will not know exactly what discount rate 
an investor will apply. Different investors may use different rates, and 
the oxl investor may apply one rate implicitly to exploration, another to 
major investment outlays, and yet another to subsequent outlays once the 
project is in operation. If the authorities decide to use a cash-flow test 
it may be appropriate to apply slightly different discount rates to 
different industries and even to different project stages. Since the 
probaDility of investment distortion on account of use of the wrong discount 
rates is higher the higher the jump in tax rate once a given return is 
achieved, the best compromise for meeting the remaining uncertainty over 
discount rates may be to use, say, three discount rates to cover the range 
of those considered to be possible for the investor. Once the costs had 
been covered at each of these discount rates, an individually modest 
additional tax could be applied to the surplus. A practical proposal for 
applying just this kind of tax (whicn I shall call a "resource rent tax"), 
has been made for United Kingdom oil and gas by a Committee for the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), chaired by Sir Antony Part, at the end 
of 1981. 
A further compxication needed in order to make this tax fulfil its purposes 
is to index cash flow for general price changes. Presumably companies make 
their projections in reax terms. To define the surplus as they see it, the 
authorities must therefore index the cash flow for tax purposes. In 
practical approximation this means accumulating or discounting for each 
period by the sum of the inflation rate and the real discount rate. 
If a resource rent tax (RRT) of this kind were to be introduced, no harm and 
some good would arise from adding on a cash-bonus bid for the purpose of 
allocating leases. The UK authorities have on ocasion used auctioning 
experimentally and in those cases have simply added the bid to existing 
levies. The advantages are that the auctioning of licences allows a given 
proportion of the rent or surplus to be collected with a lower rate of 
resource-rent tax and hence with less hazard that distorting effects may 
arise from not fixing the discount rates precisely right. The combination 
of cash-bonus bidding and resource-rent tax (say at a top rate of 85J or 
80J) would provide a resilient system. There would be no need felt to alter 
it wnen prices rose unexpectedly or a field turned out to be especially rich 
^because the 4/5 or more of any abnormal gain would be realised as tax). 
There would also be no need to alter it when prices fell, since the system 
would guarantee to collect no tax at all from the companies (other than what 
they had offered and pre-paid themselves) until a minimal return had been 
achieved. Because of the transparent simplicity of such a scheme, its 
implications for any investment or production decision are readily 
perceived, and the investor himself has a reasonable assurance that it is 
unlikely to be cnanged. By contrast investors in the UK North Sea 
(especially since 1979) have had no guarantee at all that the rules would 
not be radically different next year from this. 
48 
The UK Systea to Date 
The e x i s t i n g regime i s b u i l t on seve ra l i napprop r i a t e dev ices : an ad valorem 
r o y a l t y of 12.5? ( a b a t a b l e a t d i s c r e t i o n ) , a c o n v e n t i o n a l income tax (bu t 
a s s e s s e d s e p a r a t e l y on any company's North Sea o p e r a t i o n s ) , and the 
Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT), which in i t s o r i g i n a l conception seems to have 
been a tax on undiscounted cash flow assessed by f i e l d . The roya l ty would 
render some p r o j e c t s and much marginal e x t r a c t i o n i n e l i g i b l e : the income tax 
(corpora t ion t a x ) , though much l e s s o b j e c t i o n a b l e , could in i t s s imple form 
e i t h e r t ax p r o j e c t s t h a t would never be p r o f i t a b l e or l e a v e c o n s i d e r a b l e 
windfa l l p r o f i t s . The PRT aimed to remedy t h i s l a s t de fec t , but the base of 
undiscounted cash flow could not be l e f t l i k e t h a t ; the p o s i t i v e cash flow 
of one yea r has t o be s e t a g a i n s t t h e n e g a t i v e cash f l ows of t h e p r e c e d i n g 
p e r i o d s b e f o r e we can say t h a t i t r e p r e s e n t s any t a x a b l e s u r p l u s . So the 
PRT in i t s o r i g i n a l 1975 form was armed with var ious e l a b o r a t i o n s designed, 
l i k e t h e p r e - C o p e r n i c a n e p i c y c l e s , t o make one model appear t o f i t 
r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a t could only be c o n s i s t e n t l y s a t i s f i e d w i t h a n o t h e r . The 
" u p l i f t " p r o v i s i o n t a k e s a c c o u n t i n a c r u d e way of p r e - p r o d u c t i o n 
e x p e n d i t u r e s ; t h e " o i l a l l o w a n c e " f a v o u r s s m a l l f i e l d s on the s u p p o s i t i o n 
t h a t by and l a r g e they w i l l be the l e s s p r o f i t a b l e ones; and the "safeguard" 
p r o v i d e s t h a t PRT for any one year shou ld not exceed 80? of t h e exces s 
" p r o f i t " of t h e p e r i o d , t h a t i s of a " p r o f i t " in e x c e s s of 30? a n n u a l l y of 
c e r t a i n a c c u m u l a t e d e x p e n d i t u r e s t h a t can r o u g h l y be d e s c r i b e d as 
investment . The PRT became a kind of Roslin Chapel of a t ax ; too c lever by 
half and too complex by severa l orders of magnitude. 
Yet as we have seen these e l abo ra t i ons did not equip the system for matching 
i t s revenue c lose ly to p r o f i t a b i l i t y in changing c i rcumstances . 1979 saw a 
r i s e in t h e r a t e of PRT from 45? t o 60? and a r e d u c t i o n of the b e n e f i t s 
provided to the inves to r by the " u p l i f t " and the "o i l al lowance". 1980 saw 
a f u r t h e r r i s e to 70? and a weakening of the "safeguard". 1981 introduced a 
f u r t h e r a d d i t i o n a l t a x , t he Supplementa ry Pe t ro leum Duty (SPD), which l ay 
somewhere between an a d d i t i o n a l s l i c e of PRT and an ex t r a roya l ty . This in 
t h e view of f i n a n c i a l j o u r n a l i s t s r a i s e d t he a v e r a g e r a t e of tax on t h e 
ave rage p r o j e c t t o someth ing l i k e 89? and led t o r u m b l i n g s of r e v o l t from 
the two a s s o c i a t i o n s of o f f - s h o r e i n v e s t o r s . S i m u l a t i o n s (Kemp & Cohen; 
1980) appeared to show t h a t , even in the 1979 ve r s ion , the tax system might 
e a s i l y s w i t c h r e a l p r e s e n t v a l u e s , d i s c o u n t e d a t a r e a s o n a b l e r a t e , on an 
a c t u a l North Sea f i e l d , from p o s i t i v e to nega t ive . The SPD ceased from the 
end of 1982 in exchange for a r i s e of t h e PRT r a t e to 75? and an "advanced" 
payment of PRT. From 1983, a l l exp lo ra t ion and app r i a sa l expendi tures w i l l 
be immediately deduc t ib l e for PRT, and c e r t a i n new area:; of exp lo ra t ion w i l l 
not be s u b j e c t t o r o y a l t y and w i l l enjoy a doubled o i l a l l o w a n c e . Advance 
PRT, i n t r o d u c e d only l a s t y e a r , has begun to oe phased o u t , which w i l l 
p resumably r e l i e v e cash flow d i f f i c u l t i e s . Oi l companies seem to be 
appeased , whether or not they have much f a i t h in t h e c o n s i s t e n c y of t h e i r 
fu tu re t r e a tmen t . 
The IFS Committee Proposals 
The IFS C o m m i t t e e , r e p o r t i n g a t t h e peak p e r i o d of o i l company 
d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t in 1981, proposed t h a t the whole e d i f i c e ( r o y a l t y , 
c o r p o r a t i o n t a x , PRT and SPD) should be c l e a r e d away and r e p l a c e d by one 
" p e t r o l e u m p r o f i t s t ax" (PPT) of t h e form d e s c r i b e d above as a r e s o u r c e -
ren t t ax , a tax on r e a l i s e d discounted p resen t va lue . Their tax would have 
t h r ee t i e r s coming i n t o e f f ec t when expenses had been covered a t the r a t e s 
of 15? , 25? and 35? r e s p e c t i v e l y . Where a l l t h r e e t i e r s of tax were in 
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opera t ion the marginal r a t e on cash flow would be 85%. The Committee 
showed, by rough s imula t ions on hypothe t i ca l f i e l d s , t h a t the system 
proposed might be expected on average to raise an amount of revenue rather 
s i m i l a r to what would be co l l ec t ed under the 1980 system. They bel ieved 
that i t would qualify for c red i t ab i l i t y in the US. Kemp & Rose (1982) apply 
a s i m i l a r system (with somewhat h igher , t h a t i s more l e n i e n t , threshold 
r a t e s of r e t u r n , but a s l i g h t l y higher top r a t e of tax) to a number of 
ac tua l f i e l d s . They too find ove ra l l revenue y ie ld s i m i l a r to t ha t of the 
1981 regime but d i s t r i b u t e d d i f f e r e n t l y : heavier on the more p r o f i t a b l e 
f ie lds but leaving the marginal f ie lds with a to lerable return (1982 :42) 
The idea seems an e x c e l l e n t one, but as presented i t has two main f a u l t s . 
One i s t h a t i t does not a l low for the very i m p o r t a n t e lement of 
unpredictable inf la t ion . If the general price level were roughly stable for 
most of the next 20 yea r s , the discount r a t e s proposed could l e t new 
investors get away with very substant ial rents at only 50$ or 30$ taxation (the lowest t i e r s r e s p e c t i v e l y on the two systems of r a t e s t h a t the 
Committee sugges t ) . If on the other hand the t y p i c a l i n f l a t i o n r a t e were 
around 20%, the system could in the event be q u i t e p e n a l . Ne i the r 
poss ib i l i ty can be ruled out. On the other hand, fixing the discount ra tes 
in real terms and using a standard price index to convert to money terms i s 
extremely simple and could overcome th i s uncertainty, which in fact destroys 
the main intended strong point of the system. 
The second c r i t i c i s m i s t h a t the ac tua l choice of discount r a t e s seems to 
ignore the r i s k of d i s t o r t i o n tha t a r i s e s from having them too low or too 
high. If a 10? inf la t ion ra te i s assumed, the three discount ra tes work out 
in r ea l terms a t about 4%, 13% and 22?. While 13$ in rea l terms might 
approximate to the minimum rate of return that o i l companies might require 
in an established oi l sector within a stable democracy, no-one would expect 
them to be sa t is f ied with 4% real or to demand as much as 23? rea l . If the 
de s i r e i s to avoid d i s t o r t i n g o i l company d e c i s i o n s , r ea l r a t e s of 12.5$, 
15$ and 17.5$ say might be more appropriate. On the sample project used by 
the Committee and under 6.7$ i n f l a t i o n , these threshold r a t e s would give 
s l i g h t l y more revenue (undiscounted) , both r ea l and nominal, than the 
Committee's system with the same three tax ra tes , and would give negligibly 
more in real present value if discounted at 7-8$ real (the equivalent of 15$ 
nominal at 6.7$ inf la t ion) . 
The addi t ion of the auct ioning of r i g h t s would not in any way d i s t u rb a 
system of the type proposed by the IFS Committee, and i t might add 
signif icant additional re e""p "ne North Sea block real ised £24 million in 
current prices during a brief auctioning experiment in the early 1970s. 
My impression about o i l company objections to the IFS proposal is that they 
der ive pa r t l y from the fear t h a t i t would make t h e i r p r o f i t pos i t ion too 
c lea r and might encourage fu r ther tu rn ing of the screws. There might be 
ways of a l l ay ing t h i s fea r , which i s based on p o l i t i c a l judgement of a 
perhaps r a t h e r muddled kind. Par t ly they der ive from the ac tua l discount 
and tax r a t e s proposed, the f a i l u r e to deal with i n f l a t i o n , and the 
u n c e r t a i n t l y about how the system might be in t roduced. This l a s t i s not 
c lar i f ied in the Committee's report. The best way of dealing with existing 
p r o j e c t s might be to put the onus on the companies to show t h a t they had not 
recovered t h e i r expenses at the spec i f ied ( r e a l ) r a t e s . Fa i l ing t h i s 
demonstration they would be taxed on future net cash flows at the top ra te . 
Alternatively, as a way of keeping fa i th , exist ing projects could be allowed 
to choose to remain on the ex i s t i ng system, or ( a t any time) to switch to 
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the new one. Keeping faith has not played a large part to date, but, as and 
if companies on mature reflection chose to change, there would be a good 
advertisement thereby provided for the reasonableness of the new system. 
The United Kingdom cannot afford to deter oil investment or to curtail 
extraction from existing wells by uncertainties and anomalies. It can also 
not afford to subsidise oil investment, or to hand over a large part of the 
value of the oil resources to the companies who do the extraction. A simple 
and rational tax system is the best way of ensuring that it does none of 
these things. 
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